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NOTES
ULYSSES IN MINNESOTA: FIRST STEPS TOWARD A
SELF-BINDING PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE
DIRECTIVE STATUTE
Medical jurisprudence in the United States has grown increas-
ingly supportive of the right of patients to control their own medical
treatment. Following the lead of the common law, many states have
enacted statutes protecting patients' rights. Living wills,' health
care proxies, 2 and health care powers of attorney3 are statutory cre-
ations that enable patients to control their treatments even when
they are unconscious and therefore incompetent to make treatment
decisions. Although such statutes have existed for more than a dec-
ade, analogous statutes enabling those with mental illnesses4 to plan
for their treatments have been slow in arriving.
Many patients with recurrent mental illnesses experience peri-
ods of lucidity alternating with relapses into incompetence. 5 For
some, the mental illness manifests itself in part through the refusal
of all treatment offers and a denial of the disease.6 As a result, these
patients must undergo an often lengthy commitment process before
their physicians can administer medication that may return them to
lucidity.7 The hearing process and attendant hospitalization can be
very costly for the patient, the patient's family, and the state.8 In
1 See discussion infra part I.A.2.a.
2 See discussion infra part I.A.2.b.
3 See discussion infra part I.A.2.c.
4 The American Psychiatric Association has expressed its preference for phrases
such as "those with mental illnesses" rather than "the mentally ill:"
A common misconception is that a classification of mental disorders clas-
sifies people, when actually what are being classified are disorders that
people have. For this reason, the text.., avoids the use of such expres-
sions as "a schizophrenic" or "an alcoholic," and instead uses the more
accurate, but admittedly more cumbersome, "a person with Schizophre-
nia or "a person with Alcohol Dependence."
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS at xxiii (3d ed. revised 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
5 One example of a disease that affects patients in this way is Schizophrenia. DSM-
III-R, supra note 4, at 190.
6 Negativeness is a common feature of Catatonic Schizophrenia. DSM-III-R, supra
note 4, at 196. Denial of disease often accompanies such delusional illnesses. See DSM-
III-R, supra note 4, at 199 for a description of delusional disorders.
7 Marilyn K. Rosenson & Agnes M. Kasten, Another View of Autonomy: Arranging for
Consent in Advance, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1, 5 (1991).
8 Issue Topic, The Cost of Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 363 (1991).
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addition, the illness can impose great emotional burdens on every-
one involved.9
As a solution to such problems, some commentators have sug-
gested the use of a "Ulysses contract,"' 10 which would allow a physi-
cian to ignore a patient's disease-induced refusal and administer
medication." The "contract" serves as a record of the patient's
pre-incompetent consent to the treatment and cannot be revoked by
the patient during her incompetence. Furthermore, the Ulysses
contract overrides any subsequent incompetent treatment refusal,
thereby allowing the patient to commit herself to a chosen course of
medical care. This contract involves unusually extensive self-bind-
ing, for which the only effective method of enforcement would be
specific performance. Most commentators have concluded that
courts will not enforce such a contract absent enabling legislation.' 2
Such legislation is sorely needed by those with recurring mental
illnesses. By consenting to treatment before a relapse occurs, a pa-
tient with a mental illness can avoid the delays, costs, and unneces-
sary hospitalization that usually accompany a court order for
treatment. Additionally, a Ulysses document allows the patient to
control her own treatment without needing to designate another
person to make decisions for her. Such self-reliance and autonomy
is implicitly valued in the many decisions that have recognized the
right of a patient to control her own treatment.' 3
9 Evelyn Smith, First Person Account: Living with Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 689 (1991).
10 The contract gets its name from the hero Ulysses who was advised to bind him-
self to his ship's mast and to order his crew to ignore his cries for release:
[L]isten to what I say, and God himself shall help you to remember. First
you will meet the Sirens, who cast a spell on every man who goes their
way. Whoso draws near unwarned and hears the Sirens' voices, by him
no wife or little child shall ever stand, glad at his coming home; for the
Sirens cast a spell of penetrating song, sitting within a meadow. But by
their side is a great heap of rotting human bones; fragments of skin are
shriveling on them. Therefore sail on, and stop your comrades' ears with
sweet wax kneaded soft, that none of the rest may hear. As for yourself, if
you desire to listen, see that they bind you hand and foot on the swift
ship, upright upon the mast-block, - round the mast let the rope's ends
be wound, - that so with pleasure you may hear the Sirens' song. But if
you should entreat your men and bid them set you free, let them thereat
with still more fetters bind you fast.
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 405 (George H. Palmer trans., Houghton & Mifflin 1886) (n.d.).
11 See Timothy Howell et al., Is There a Case for Voluntary Commitment?, in CoNTEMPO-
RARY ISSUES IN BioETHics 163 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 2d ed. 1982).
12 See Rebecca S. Dresser, Bound to Treatment: The Ulysses Contract, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., June 1984, at 13 [hereinafter Dresser, Bound to Treatment]; Rebecca S. Dresser,
Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract 16
HAuv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 777, 795 (1982) [hereinafter Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists].
13 See discussion infra part I.A.1.
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Minnesota took the first step towards enacting a Ulysses en-
abling statute in 1991 when its legislature passed an amendment to
the state's psychiatric treatment laws creating the "advance psychi-
atric directive." 14 The new statutory scheme allows a patient to use
such a directive to refuse or consent, in advance, to intrusive mental
health treatment.15 The amendment also appears to authorize the
use of a "Ulysses directive," which would have the same effect as a
Ulysses contract.' 6 If this were true, Minnesota's statute would be
the first Ulysses enabling statute in the country, providing a proto-
type for other states to follow.
This Note argues that the Minnesota statute, which could have
guided the drafting of similar laws in the rest of the nation, fails to
meet the special needs of patients with recurring mental illnesses.
The statute, as applied under current medical decision making case
law, does not allow a patient to bind herself prospectively to a
course of treatment in anticipation of making a later, incompetent
treatment refusal.' 7 Its primary weaknesses are in failing to specifi-
cally empower physicians to make determinations of incompetency,
and in not employing the safeguards necessary for such a delega-
tion. With some changes, however, the Minnesota statute could be
an effective Ulysses directive enabling statute and a model for other
states.
Part I of this Note reviews the evolution of medical jurispru-
dence and the emergence of advance directive statutes. Part II ex-
amines the Minnesota advance psychiatric directive statute in light
of current case law, and concludes that the combined statutory and
case law does not permit the drafting of a Ulysses directive. Finally,
Part III proposes changes to the statute that would allow patients
suffering from recurring mental illnesses to control their treatment
in the face of expected treatment refusals. With these changes in
place, Minnesota's statute would stand as a model for other states
wishing to adopt laws fully enabling Ulysses directives.
14 MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, subd. 6b-d (Supp. 1993).
15 "A competent adult may make a declaration of preferences or instructions re-
garding intrusive mental health treatment. These preferences or instructions may in-
clude, but are not limited to, consent to or refusal of these treatments." MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.03, subd. 6d(a) (Supp. 1993). An "intrusive mental health treatment" includes
electroshock therapy and neuroleptic medication. § 253B.03, subd. 6b.
16 This Note will use the term "Ulysses directive" to refer to a document enabled
by a statute that provides for self-binding to a chosen course of treatment in the face of
anticipated subsequent treatment refusals. The term "Ulysses contract" will be used to
refer to such documents not enabled by a statute.
17 See discussion infra part II.B.
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I
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE THE ULYSSES DIRECTIVE
This section will examine the development of patient self-deter-
mination law to the present. First, this section will review medical
jurisprudence and its increasing regard for the rights of patients.
Next, it will examine the treatment control problems that have moti-
vated the call for the Ulysses contract. Finally, this section will in-
troduce Minnesota's response to such problems through its advance
psychiatric directive statute.
A. The Move Toward Patient Self-Determination
A great degree of physician paternalism marked the early prac-
tice of medicine.' 8 The role of the physician was to decide for the
patient which treatment was best.' 9 Societal changes gradually led
to greater demands for patient participation in and control of treat-
ment decision-making; 20 legislatures responded by enacting laws
that recognize and increase patient autonomy.
1. Case Law Developments
United States medical jurisprudence during the twentieth cen-
tury has focused on the balance of power in the physician-patient
relationship.2 1 Until the early part of this century, physicians played
a paternalistic role, making most or all treatment decisions for the
patient.22 Consent was limited to mere approval of the physician's
suggested treatment. 23 Courts have changed this balance, giving
patients increased control. In 1914, in one of the earliest treatment
decision cases, Schloendorffv. Society of N. Y. Hospital,24 Judge Cardozo
formulated the rule that still informs such cases today: "Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body ....- 25
A weakening of the two limits of the Schloendorff rule-age and
competence-has characterized the development of self-determina-
tion in medical treatment decisions. Although the courts have given
18 See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale?, 39 U. Prrr. L. REV. 137, 140 (1977).
19 See id.; Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient
Relationship, 267JAMA 2221 (1992).
20 See Katz, supra note 18, at 149-164; JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW 164-
79 (1993).
21 See Katz, supra note 18, at 143-154.
22 See Katz, supra note 18, at 143-154.
23 See Katz, supra note 18, at 144; Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 19.
24 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
25 Id. at 93.
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children some say over their treatment,26 the greatest expansion has
occurred in the area of self-determination for patients with mental
illnesses. 27 Rennie v. Klein, 28 decided in 1983, is one of the earliest
cases recognizing that patients with mental illnesses, including those
involuntarily committed, have a right to refuse treatment based on
due process and privacy rights. This right is qualified where the pa-
tient constitutes a danger to himself or others. 29 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Rogers v. Commissioner of the Depart-
ment of Mental Health 30 underscored the lessons of Rennie by holding
that the right of a patient with a mental illness to control his own
treatment is equal to that of any other patient, until the courts deter-
mine him to be incompetent.31 The court held that only when the
patient presents an immediate danger to himself or to others may
the state treat the objecting patient without first obtaining a court
order.3 2 More recent decisions have established that the law ac-
cords weaker procedural protections to the treatment refusal rights
of imprisoned patients with mental illnesses than it does to other
patients with mental illnesses.3 3 However, such patients still possess
a limited right of refusal, and a related right to be informed of treat-
ment alternatives.3 4
Although not dealing with mental health treatment control, the
Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health3 5 affirmed many of the previously established rules
and policies underlying patient autonomy. The Court determined
that a state's requirement of clear and convincing evidence of an
incompetent patient's treatment wishes before removal of life-sus-
taining treatment does not violate the Federal Constitution.3 6 The
patient has a right to decide whether to continue treatment, but this
right must be balanced against the state's interest in verifying the
26 See WalterJ. Wadlington, Consent to Medical Care for Minors, in CHILDREN'S COMPE-
TENCE TO CONSENT 57-69, 73-74 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); SAMUEL M. DAvis &
MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 79-98 (1987).
27 See MOHR, supra note 20. For a thorough account of the right to refuse antip-
sychotic drugs, see Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to 'Just Say No ": A History and Analysis of
the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REv. 283 (1992).
28 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
29 Id. at 269.
30 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
Sl Id. at 314.
32 Id. at 321-22.
33 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
34 White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 113 (3d Cir. 1990).
35 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36 Id. at 280.
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incompetent patient's wishes.3 7 In such situations living wills pro-
vide the easiest means of meeting this standard of proof.3 8
2. Statutory Developments
In an effort to systemize these common law developments in
treatment control, many states have enacted statutes creating de-
vices that enable patients to control their medical treatment. The
statutes of longest standing are those that transfer decision-making
power to another person-the health care proxy, durable power of
attorney, and durable health care power of attorney. More widely
known and used is the living will, a document that serves to preserve
the competent wishes and intentions of the drafter regarding the
withdrawal or continuation of life-sustaining treatment in cases of
terminal illness or irreversible coma.39 Because these statutes are
among the most developed in the area of treatment control, they
highlight the necessary elements of sound advance directive
legislation.
a. Living Wills
Forty-three jurisdictions in the United States now have some
form of living will statute,40 a few of which are based on the model
37 Id. at 280-82.
38 See discussion of living wills infra part I.A.2.a.
39 All living will statutes are limited to these circumstances. See UNIFORM RIGHTS OF
THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 615 (1989) (limiting itself to terminal conditions
only); infra note 40.
40 Currently, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have a "living will,"
"death with dignity," "natural death," or "right to die" statute: ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1
to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-.100 (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-
3201 to -3211 (1986 & Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Michie
1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-
570 to -580c (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.301-.310 (West Supp.
1993); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1991 & Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 327D-1 to -27 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985
& Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.11 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-
28,101 to -28,109 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-.644 (Baldwin 1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-701 to
-714 (West Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1993); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055
(Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 449.535-.690 (Michie 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990 &
Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (Michie 1991); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§§ 2960-2979 (McKinney Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -323 (1990); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101.1-.16 (West Supp. 1993); OR. REV STAT. §§ 127.605-.650
(1990 & Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 672.001-.021 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (1993); VT. STAT.
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drafted by the American Bar Association Commission on Uniform
Laws.4 1 Many of these statutes include a statement of legislative
purpose reflecting Judge Cardozo's holding in Schloendorf,42 that
every competent adult has the right to accept or reject medical treat-
ment.43 Despite this expansive statement of purpose, all of these
statutes limit their application to the regulation of life-sustaining
treatments in cases involving terminal illness or irreversible vegeta-
tive state.44
Some living will statutes provide model wills with boxes pa-
tients can check to request or reject particular treatment direc-
tions;45 others allow the drafter to detail those treatments to be
accepted or rejected.46 Almost all statutes permit revocation of the
living will by act or statement regardless of the drafter's mental or
physical condition. 47 This reflects the belief that it is better to err
against a patient's wishes by continuing, rather than withdrawing,
life sustaining treatment. Similarly, a few states provide for the in-
validation of the living will if, and for as long as, a patient is preg-
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Michie 1991 &
Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); W.
VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -13 (1991 & Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West
1989 & Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988). See also Act to amend
[recodify] the Code Concerning health and hospitals, 1993 Ind. Legis. Serv. 2-1993,
§ 19 (to be codified at IND. CODE §§ 16-36-4-1 to -21); Health Care Decision Act, 1993
Md. Laws 372 (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN §§ 5-601 to -618).
41 UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT §§ 1-18, 9B U.L.A. 609-23 (1989).
42 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
43 "The Legislature finds an adult person has the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of his or her own medical care." CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7185.5(a) (West Supp. 1993). See also ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (1990);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-102(I)(a) (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.102 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-32-1(d)
(1991 & Supp. 1993); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327D-1 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4502 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-1 (Burns 1990); IowA CODE ANN. § 144A.1
(West 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1(A)(1) (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 137-H:1 (1990 & Supp. 1992); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney Supp.
1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(a) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-10 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1102(2) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5251
(1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
44 Some statutes also allow the removal of artificial nourishment or specifically ex-
clude palliative care from the list of treatments that can be controlled through a living
will. See supra note 40.
45 Because of the small range of decisions the patient can make, and the low risk of
misinterpretation of such decisions, living wills can easily be designed as box-checking
forms. Some state statutes provide a sample form in which the drafter identifies those
treatments he does or does not want to receive by marking them on a model form. See
ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.010(c) (1986).
46 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186.5(b)
(West Supp. 1993).
47 See UNIFORM RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 616 (1989); supra
note 40.
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nant.48  Commentators have vigorously questioned the
constitutionality of such provisions. 49
Generally, the drafter of a living will is limited by the terms of
the living will statute, which narrows the range of decisions to be
made.50 Living will statutes govern a limited number of situations
and provide only a few treatment options-to withdraw or continue
feeding, to withdraw or continue mechanical support, or to resusci-
tate or not in the event of an emergency. The patient is presented
with a hypothetical scenario in which he is unconscious, and in
which two physicians have determined that he is either terminally ill
or in an irreversible coma. The patient must then decide whether,
under such circumstances, he would want his life artificially pro-
longed. He confronts a fairly predictable outcome in the event that
his physician follows the living will, and he is likely to have estab-
lished feelings about the desirability of each alternative. Thus the
drafter might decide that he would not want to be resuscitated from
a heart attack during a persistent vegetative state but that he would
want to continue to receive nourishment and hydration. A physician
presented with a living will can feel confident that he understands
the drafter's intent, and the drafter can expect that the document
will not be misinterpreted.5 1
b. Health Care Proxy
Living will statutes often provide for the designation of a health
care proxy-a person designated to oversee the enactment of the
incompetent patient's wishes. 52 This increases the flexibility of the
living will and makes it more likely that a patient's wishes will be
48 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-11(d) (Bums 1990); MINN. STAT. § 145B.13(3)
(Supp. 1993).
49 These commentators have argued that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1975),
the state may not interfere with a woman's medical decisions until the fetus reaches
viability. SeeJoan Mahoney, Death with Dignity: Is there an Exception for Pregnant Women?, 57
UMKC L. REV. 221 (1989); Elizabeth C. Benton, Note, The Constitutionality of Pregnancy
Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1821 (1990); Molly C. Dyke, Note, A
Matter of Life and Death: Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 70 B.U. L. REV. 867
(1990); Janice MacAvoy-Snitzer, Note, Pregnancy Clauses in Living Will Statutes, 87 COLUM.
L. REV 1280 (1987); Hope E. Matchan & Kathryn E. Sheffield, Comment, Adding Constitu-
tional Depravation to Untimely Death: South Dakota's Living Will Pregnancy Provision, 37 S.D.
L. REV. 388 (1992).
50 All living will statutes limit their application to either or both irreversible coma
(or vegetative state) and terminal illness. See supra notes 39-40.
51 But see Hastings Center, Case Study, Whether No Means No, HASnNGS CENTER
REP., May-June 1992, at 26 (presenting a situation in which an express refusal of all life-
sustaining treatments is not clearly applicable).
52 See supra note 40.
1993] 1159
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
fulfilled.53 The health care proxy's power is restricted to those situ-
ations in which a living will may apply: cases of terminal illness or
irreversible coma.54 As with a living will, a patient can revoke the
proxy assignment at any time, regardless of the patient's physical or
mental condition.5 5 The reasons for these limitations are similar to
those behind the revocation power of the living will: to achieve most
completely the wishes of the patient, while erring, if at all, by contin-
uing, rather than withdrawing, treatment.5 6
Most writers encourage the nomination of a health care proxy
when a living will is created. 57 The proxy is someone with whom a
physician can consult in cases involving unforeseen circumstances.58
The proxy, generally someone who knows the patient well, can also
help resolve any ambiguities in the living will by providing insight
into the patient's attitudes towards particular treatment options.59
The health care proxy plays a fairly limited role. She must
make decisions that would accord with the patient's wishes as ex-
pressed in any advance directive documents and with her knowledge
of the patient.60 Furthermore, if the drafter desires, he can limit the
proxy's power by expressly withholding in the appointing document
the authority to act in specified situations. 61
c. Durable Power of Attorney and Durable Health Care Power of
Attorney
Two decision-making options with more general application
than the health care proxy are the durable power of attorney and the
durable health care power of attorney. The former is a wide-rang-
ing power that allows the holder to make any decision that the gran-
tor of the power could have made.62 The latter is limited in scope to
decisions concerning the health care of the grantor.65
53 See Lewis M. Silverman & Manette Dennis, Comment to Case Study, Whether No
Means No, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1992, at 26-27 (describing how the proxy
can help clarify a patient's wishes).
54 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580 (West Supp. 1993).
55 Id.
56 See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12.
57 See Howard L. Sollins, Advance Medical Directives, MD. BJ., Mar./Apr. 1991, at 7,
10- 11; Advance Medical Directives, Wis. LAw., Oct. 1991, at 17.
58 Most proxy statutes recommend that the proxy be a family member or a close
friend who is likely to know the patient's treatment preferences.
59 For example, the decision to remove Nancy Cruzan's life support and artificial
feeding was based not on a living will, but on testimony by friends and co-workers that
she had said that she "would not want to live should she face life as like a 'vegetable'."
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285 (1990).
60 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -580 (West Supp. 1993).
61 Id.
62 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-1303 (West Supp. 1992).
63 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-8-12-6 (Bums 1992).
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In a jurisdiction that has only the more general power of attor-
ney, the grantor can create a health care power of attorney by using
the general appointing document to limit the power to the field of
health care. A jurisdiction with statutes supporting both powers
provides for no extra attorney power, but simply facilitates the limi-
tation of the general power to health decisions.
The durable health care power of attorney gives the holder of
the power the same treatment decision making rights as the gran-
tor.64 Generally, the statutes require that the holder exercise her
power in conformance with the grantor's expressed desires. 65 The
powers of attorney embrace all treatment decisions that the patient
could have made. This includes the power to revoke the grantor's
independent treatment instructions, making it possible to subvert
the patient's intent by revoking any advance treatment directives,
and then making treatment decisions that the directives would have
prohibited.66 In contrast, the powers of a health care proxy are not
as susceptible to abuse because they are explicitly limited to the
terms of the grantor's living will. 67
To prevent this misuse of the power of attorney, the grantor
should limit the power holder through restrictions in the granting
document. For example, a patient with religious prohibitions
against accepting certain treatments might limit the health care at-
torney's power to the rejection of these treatments. These limita-
tions can either repeat the orders included in any advance directive,
withhold the power to revoke any advance directives, or both.
Despite many similarities, powers of attorney differ from health
care proxies in that the granted power is more extensive. The
holder of a durable health care power of attorney may make deci-
sions in all medical cases, whereas the health care proxy under a
living will may only make decisions concerning the use of life-sus-
taining treatment.68 However, durable powers of attorney are advis-
able for the same reasons that health care proxies are-they increase
the flexibility of the advance directive and make it more likely that
all decisions will be made in accordance with the general treatment
wishes of the patient.
64 See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-8-12-6 (Bums 1992).
65 Id. at (h)(1).
66 For an example of the ways in which power holders can misuse their powers, see
Dakin Williams, Where They Can Force People to Stay, in BLUE JOLTS 23 (Charles Steir ed.,
1978).
67 See discussion supra part I.A.2.b.
68 The proxy under the Minnesota advance psychiatric directive statute is empow-
ered to make decisions regarding the use of intrusive mental health treatment-only
those decisions that can be made in an advance psychiatric directive. § 253B.03, subd.
6d(b).
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Although powers of attorney give patients with mental illnesses
one method of controlling their treatment while incompetent, such
powers require an intermediary to make or enforce decisions, and
thus do not provide the self-sufficiency and independence inherent
in a documentary advance directive. The empowerment of the doc-
ument-writing patients is an important reason to make Ulysses di-
rectives available to patients with mental illnesses.
B. Problems of Patients with Mental Illnesses to be Remedied
by a Directive Statute
Any directive power or document used to dictate treatment will
serve one or both of two purposes. The first, avoidance of un-
wanted treatment, is general to medical treatment decision-making.
The second, overcoming disease-motivated refusal of competently
requested treatment, is specific to patients with mental illnesses.
1. Unwanted Treatment
Because mental health treatments can be unpleasant 69 and can
cause severe side effects, 70 a patient who has received such a treat-
ment might wish to prevent its use in the future.71 The patient
might also seek to specify alternative treatments that she would be
willing to accept in lieu of the prohibited one. To enact the pa-
tient's wishes in such a case, some writers have proposed the "psy-
chiatric will."' 72 Such a document, modeled on the living will, would
contain directives that prevent physicians from using designated
treatments on the incompetent patient.73
In 1992, a patient in Minnesota drafted the first psychiatric will
in the country after she became unhappy with her treatment, which
had included the use of chemical and physical restraints. 74 By draft-
ing such a will she was able to ensure that she would not be heavily
sedated or physically restrained during her next episode of incom-
69 Electro-convulsive therapy is generally regarded as one such unpleasant treat-
ment. See Ivan Belknap, Worry Warts, in BLUEJOLTS 98 (Charles Steir ed., 1978); ROBERT
M. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 309-10 (1977).
70 For instance, some neuroleptic medications that are used to treat schizophrenia
can cause tardive dyskinesia, a potentially fatal disease that attacks the nervous system.
See Daniel E. Casey, The Differential Diagnosis of Tardive Dyskinesia, 291 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA SUPPLEMENTUM 71, 71-73 (1981).
71 See Jean Hopfensperger, Mental Patients Can Direct Treatment with a "Living Will",
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 17, 1992, at lB.
72 The "psychiatric will" was first proposed in Thomas S. Szasz, The Psychiatric Will:
A New Mechanism for Protecting Persons Against "Psychosis" and Psychiatry, 37 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 762 (1982).
73 Id. at 766.
74 See Hopfensperger, supra note 71.
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petence.75 In addition, by using guardianship statutes and powers
of attorney, she was able to arrange for the care of her child, as well
as for the orderly maintenance of her life's affairs. 76
2. Disease-Motivated Refusal of Competently Requested Treatment
The second group of patients desirous of advance treatment di-
rectives are those with illnesses, such as schizophrenia or manic de-
pression, that can cause the patients to refuse offers of treatment.
Once a relapse begins, such patients become uncooperative and
often, as a result of the disease, refuse to accept any treatment.77
Before they can receive medical care, patients generally must en-
dure a lengthy incompetency hearing. If a patient is found incom-
petent, the court can issue a treatment order providing for forced
medication, which may allow a return to lucidity.78 Early treatment
in such cases, however, could prevent a patient from experiencing a
full relapse with all its symptoms, and could save the time, cost and
suffering of a lengthy illness.79
The costs of a full-blown mental illness requiring hospitaliza-
tion can be extensive.80 These costs are often borne by the state
because many mental patients are committed to state-run facili-
ties. 8' In addition to the costs of care and treatment, a long mental
illness decreases the patient's productivity, and often that of the pa-
tient's family as well.82 Finally, such mental illness involves great
suffering on the part of the patient and his family.83
To reduce the suffering and costs involved in a long illness,
commentators have suggested using a "Ulysses contract." 84 The
document adopts the Roman name of the Greek hero Odysseus who
ordered his companions to bind him to his ship's mast and to ignore
his pleas to be released as they sailed past the island of the Sirens.85
The Ulysses contract is intended to allow a physician to ignore the
75 See Hopfensperger, supra note 71.
76 See Hopfensperger, supra note 71.
77 See DSM-III-R, supra note 4, at 196.
78 See MINN. STAT. § 253A.07 subd. 3 (1982).
79 See Rosenson & Kasten, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing the impact of having to wait
for medication).
80 See supra note 8.
81 See supra note 8.
82 See Smith, supra note 9.
83 See Smith, supra note 9.
84 The origin of the term is unclear, but it was used as early as 1982. See Hastings
Center, Case Study, Can a Subject Consent to a "Ulysses Contract"?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug. 1982, at 26. A detailed proposal for a "voluntary commitment contract," very sim-
ilar to the Ulysses contract, was made that same year. See also Howell, supra note 11, at
163.
85 See supra note 10.
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treatment refusals of an incompetent patient when the patient's ill-
ness is the source of the refusals.8 6
Cast as an agreement between a patient and his or her physi-
cian,8 7 this "contract" is very different from any advance directive
that has been used or proposed in the past and raises difficult ethical
and legal questions. 8 The greatest legal concern is that these con-
tracts cannot be enforced in the absence of legislation specifically
endorsing them.8 9 The only useful recourse in the event of a subse-
quent treatment refusal would be specific performance-a remedy
generally disfavored by the courts.90 Additionally, existing treat-
ment control documents cannot be adapted for use by patients with
recurrent mental illnesses.91
Because it is statutorily supported, a Ulysses directive is differ-
ent from a Ulysses contract and avoids the contract's problems.
Like a Ulysses contract, the Ulysses directive gives instructions to
the patient's physicians on how the patient is to be treated; permis-
sion to ignore subsequent incompetent treatment refusals, however,
is a unique feature of the Ulysses directive. Although contract-
based objections do not apply to the directive, other concerns re-
main and new problems arise.92
One of the greatest dangers of Ulysses directives is the possibil-
ity that a patient with such a directive, who is in fact competent to
refuse treatments, will be denied the ability to make a competent
treatment refusal. This danger has due process ramifications and
poses the greatest challenge to legislatures seeking to draft a
Ulysses directive enabling statute.93
Despite the intricacies involved in drafting such a statute, the
benefits to the patient, his family, and the state in avoided costs and
86 See Morton E. Winston & Sally M. Winston, Commentary to Case Study, Can a
Subject Consent to a "Ulysses Contract"?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 26-27 [here-
inafter Winston & Winston, Consent to a "Ulysses Contract'].
87 The first suggested methods for the avoidance of the incompetent refusal of re-
quested treatment were contracts for treatment between the patient and the physician.
When the patient, as expected, refused treatment, the physician could sue in contract for
specific performance. There were obvious problems with this sort of agreement, but
they were seen as the only way to solve the Ulysses problem in the absence of a statute
enabling Ulysses directives. See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12, at part
Ii.
88 For discussions of the ethical concerns raised by Ulysses contracts see, id.; Win-
ston & Winston, Consent to a "Ulysses Contract", supra note 86, at 26; Paul Chodoff& Roger
Peele, The Psychiatric Will Of Dr. Szasz, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1983, at 11-12;
Dresser, Bound to Treatment, supra note 12, at 15-16. For the legal implications of such a
statute see discussion infra part II.B.
89 See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12, at part II.
90 See JoHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRAcrs § 16-1 (3d ed. 1987).
91 See discussion supra part I.A.2.a.
92 See discussion infra part II.B.
93 See discussion infra part II.B.
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suffering more than justify the effort. As yet, no state has passed a
true enabling statute, but Minnesota has taken the first steps.
C. First Steps in Minnesota
In 1991, in order to address the special treatment decision
problems of patients with mental illnesses, Minnesota became the
first state94 to enact a statute allowing citizens to draft directives for
intrusive mental health treatments.95 The statute, organized much
94 The advance psychiatric directive statute is still unique to Minnesota.
95 The relevant portions of the statute are:
Subd. 6b. CONSENT FOR MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT. A
competent person admitted or committed to a treatment facility may be
subjected to intrusive mental health treatment only with the person's
written informed consent. For purposes of this section, "intrusive mental
health treatment" means electroshock therapy and neuroleptic medica-
tion and does not include treatment for mental retardation. An incompe-
tent person who has prepared a directive under subdivision 6d regarding
treatment with intrusive therapies must be treated in accordance with this
section, except in cases of emergencies.
Subd. 6c. ADMINISTRATION OF NEUROLEPTIC MEDICA-
TIONS ....
(c) A neuroleptic medication may be administered to a patient who
is not competent to consent to neuroleptic medications if the patient,
when competent, prepared a declaration under subdivision 6d requesting
the treatment or authorizing a proxy to request the treatment or if a court
approves the administration of the neuroleptic medication.
Subd. 6d. ADULT MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT. (a) A com-
petent adult may make a declaration of preferences or instructions re-
garding intrusive mental health treatment. These preferences or
instructions may include, but are not limited to, consent to or refusal of
these treatments.
(b) A declaration may designate a proxy to make decisions about in-
trusive mental health treatment. A proxy designated to make decisions
about intrusive mental health treatments and who agrees to serve as a
proxy may make decisions on behalf of a declarant consistent with any
desires the declarant expresses in the declaration.
(c) .... The physician or provider must comply with [the declara-
tion] to the fullest extent possible, consistent with reasonable medical
practice, the availability of treatments requested, and applicable law....
(d) .... If the declarant has been committed as a patient under this
chapter, the physician or provider may subject a declarant to intrusive
treatment in a manner contrary to the declarant's expressed wishes, only
upon order of the committing court. If the declarant is not a committed
patient under this chapter, the physician or provider may subject the de-
clarant to intrusive treatment in a manner contrary to the declarant's ex-
pressed wishes, only if the declarant is committed as mentally ill or
mentally ill and dangerous to the public and a court order authorizing the
treatment has been issued.
(e) A declaration under this subdivision may be revoked in whole or
in part at any time and in any manner by the declarant if the declarant is
competent at the time of revocation. A revocation is effective when a
competent declarant communicates the revocation to the attending physi-
cian or other provider.
MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, subd. 6b-d (Supp. 1993).
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like a living will enabling statute,96 allows for consent to or refusal
of treatments; 97 designation of a proxy to make decisions for the
incompetent patient;98 and revocation by a competent patient.99
The statute requires a physician informed of the existence of an ad-
vance psychiatric directive to fulfill its demands to the greatest ex-
tent possible, 100 and protects from liability a physician who acts in
good faith reliance on the validity of the directive.' 0 '
The statute also governs the use of neuroleptic medications, 0 2
which can have serious side effects.' 0 3 The statute explicitly allows
neuroleptic treatment of a non-objecting, incompetent patient with
an advance psychiatric directive authorizing the treatment.'0 4 A
physician may treat such a patient without a court order.'05
II
MINNESOTA MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT LAW
The Minnesota advance psychiatric directive statute allows pa-
tients to give advance consent to intrusive mental health treat-
ments.' 0 6 However, even when a patient makes an incompetent
refusal, Minnesota courts will require the usual hearings for the
forced administration of intrusive mental health treatments. ' 0 7 This
section will examine the Ulysses directive's interaction with Minne-
sota law. It will also show that because most states' mental health
laws are similar to Minnesota's, a Minnesota Ulysses directive en-
abling statute could serve as a model for other states. This would
benefit patients with mental illnesses in other states who need the
Ulysses directive for the same reasons Minnesotans do.10 8 This part
will first examine Minnesota's incompetency law and its treatment of
patients with mental illness. It will then conclude that Minnesota's
hostility towards excessive physician power will prevent the use of a
Ulysses directive under the current statute.
96 The Minnesota advance psychiatric directive statute is analyzed in greater detail
infra part II.B.
97 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(a).
98 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(b).
99 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(e).
100 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(c)[4].
101 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(f).
102 § 253B.03, subd. 6c. Nowhere in the statute is "neuroleptic medication" de-
fined. "Neuroleptics" are antipsychotic drugs that act, with one exception, by blocking
the dopamine receptor. MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1635 (Robert
Berkow et al. eds., 16th ed. 1992).
103 Hastings Center, Case Study, Consent to a "Ulysses Contract, " supra note 70, at 26.
104 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(c). See discussion infra 151-53 and accompanying text.
105 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(c).
106 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(a).
107 See discussion infra part II.B.
108 See discussion supra part I.B.2.
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A. Minnesota Incompetency Law
Minnesota's current law on the right of the mentally ill to refuse
treatment has evolved through a long line of cases. Although this
case law is more developed and extensive than that of other
states, 10 9 the principles on which it relies and the conclusions it
reaches are fairly uniform among the various jurisdictions.110
109 The major Minnesota cases in this area are: Price v. Sheppard, 239 N.W.2d 905
(Minn. 1976); Minnesota St. Bd. of Health v. City of Brainerd, 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn.
1976), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 803 (1976); In re Kinzer, 375 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Jarvis v. Levine, 403 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) aff'd in part, and
rev'd in part, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988); In reJarvis, 433 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); In re Steen, 437 N.W.2d 101 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); In re Lambert, 437 N.W.2d
106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989); In re Peterson,
446 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); In re Muntner, 470 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); In re Chonis, 478 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1991); In re Blilie, 484 N.W.2d 34 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 494 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1993). There are also several unreported
cases applying established Minnesota law.
110 See Barnes v. Dale, 530 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1988); Anderson v. State, 663 P.2d 570
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Riese v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199
(Ct. App. 1987); Conservatorship of Waltz, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Ct. App. 1986); Keyhea
v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (Ct. App. 1986); Conservatorship of Fadley, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Aden v. Younger, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1976);
Goedecke v. State Dep't of Institutions, 603 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1979); Hopkins v. People,
772 P.2d 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); People ix reL M.K.M., 765 P.2d 1075 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1988); People ix reL Medina, 662 P.2d 184 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd 705 P.2d
961 (Colo. 1985); People ev rel. Freeman, 636 P.2d 1334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); In re
Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1988); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979); Meeker v.
State, 584 So. 2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Lang, 545 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1989); In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988); In re Tarpley, 581 N.E.2d 1251
(Ind. 1991); In re M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987); Clites v. State, 322 N.W.2d 917
(Iowa Ct. App. 1982); Gundy v. Pauley, 619 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); In re Roe,
583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992); In re Weedon, 565 N.E.2d 432 (Mass 1991); In re Linda,
519 N.E.2d 1296 (Mass. 1988); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983); In re Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 1981); Belger v. Arnot, 183
N.E.2d 866 (Mass. 1962); Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1971); Koloco-
tronis v. Ritterbusch, 667 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Reiser v. Prunty, 727 P.2d
538 (Mont. 1986); Opinion ofJustices, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983); In re B., 383 A.2d 760
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); In re W.S., 377 A.2d 969 (N.J. Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Ct. 1977); In re Sanders, 773 P.2d 1241 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); Rivers v. Katz,
495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); In re Mary Ann D., 578 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 1992); In re
McConnell, 538 N.Y.S.2d 101 (App. Div. 1989); Eleanor R. v. South Oaks Hosp., 506
N.Y.S.2d 763 (App. Div. 1986); In re Garrett, 538 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Sup. Ct. 1989); In re
Lesser, 544 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Savastano v. Saribeyoglu, 480 N.Y.S.2d 977
(Sup. Ct. 1984); New York Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct.
1972); In re Willis, 599 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Clark v. Ohio Dep't of Mental
Health, 573 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio Ct. Claims 1989); In re K.K.B., 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980);
In re L.R., 497 A.2d 753 (Vt. 1985); In re Schuoler, 723 P.2d 1103 (Wash. 1986); In re
G.S., 348 N.W.2d 181 (Wis. 1984); State ix rel. Roberta A.S. v. Waukesha County
Human Servs. Dep't, 491 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992); In re K.S., 433 N.W.2d 291
(Wis. Ct. App. 1988); K.N.K. v. Buhler, 407 N.W.2d 281 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); State ix
rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 400 N.W.2d I (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd 416 N.W.2d 883
(Wis. 1987).
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In 1976 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided its first major
treatment decision case, Price v. Sheppard, I I I holding that "intrusive"
treatments infringe on a committed patient's right to privacy and
therefore cannot be administered over a patient's refusal without
judicial approval.1 12 The court balanced the state's interest in mak-
ing treatment decisions for a patient who is incompetent against the
individual's highly protected privacy interest.113 It held that any
treatment approved by a court must be the least intrusive under the
circumstances, as determined by examining the treatment's charac-
teristics.1 14 The court further found that psychosurgery and elec-
troconvulsive therapy are both sufficiently intrusive so as to require
a hearing before a patient can be given such treatment against her
will. 115 However, the court explicitly declined to rule on whether
neuroleptic medication is also an intrusive treatment. 116
In the 1988 case ofJarvis v. Levine1 17 the Minnesota Supreme
Court filled this gap by holding that neuroleptic medication is in-
deed an intrusive mental health treatment.118 TheJarvis court dis-
tinguished commitment to a mental institution from incompetence
to consent to or refuse treatment; the former does not entail the
latter. 19 The court stated explicitly that, "a finding of legal incom-
petence is a prerequisite to involuntary medication with neurolep-
tics."' 120 The court neglected, however, to define incompetence or
explain how it is to be established.
Minnesota's legal standards on incompetence to consent to
medical procedures derive in large part from Dr. James C. Beck's
111 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
112 Id.
113 Id. at911.
114 Factors which should be considered are (1) the extent and duration of
changes in behavior patterns and mental activity effected by the treat-
ment, (2) the risks of adverse side effects, (3) the experimental nature of
the treatment, (4) its acceptance by the medical community of [Minne-
sota], (5) the extent of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain con-
nected with the treatment, and (6) the patient's ability to completely
determine for himself whether the treatment is desirable.
Id. at 913.
115 There are three requirements for such a proceeding, known as a Price hearing.
First, where the patient or the patient's guardian has refused treatment, the medical
director of the state hospital where the patient is committed must petition the local pro-
bate court for an order authorizing treatment. Second, the court must appoint a guard-
ian ad litem to represent the patient's interests. Finally, the court must hold an
adversary proceeding to determine the necessity and reasonableness of the proposed
treatment. Id.
116 Id.
117 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
118 Id at 148.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 148 n.7.
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1987 article, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Psychiatric Assess-
ment and Legal Decision-making.12 1 Dr. Beck wrote:
Although there is a wide range of expert psychiatric opinion on
how to define competency, two basic elements are present in most
definitions: the capacity to assimilate relevant facts, and an appre-
ciation or rational understanding of the person's situation as it
relates to the facts. A clinical definition that combines these two
elements states that a mentally disordered person is competent to
refuse to take antipsychotic medication if he or she is aware of
having a mental disorder; has sufficient knowledge about medica-
tion and mental disorder; and does not base the refusal on
delusional beliefs. A voluntary decision by a person who has this
awareness and knowledge is a competent or legally valid
decision. 122
A competent refusal of antipsychotic medication requires that the
patient understand the reasons for the physician's prescription, in-
cluding the physician's determination that the patient has a mental
disorder. 123 However, the patient may disagree with the physician's
assessment of the expected benefits and possible risks, and so com-
petently refuse the treatment. 124
The Minnesota courts have adopted Beck's three-part analy-
sis-awareness of disease, knowledge of treatments, and rationality
in thought processes-in several decisions. The Minnesota
Supreme Court inJarvis v. Levine, 125 although failing to define "in-
competence," cited Beck as a source of factors to consider in deter-
mining competence to refuse treatment. 126 The court of appeals'
1989 decision, In re Lambert,127 held that a patient who did not meet
the three Beck criteria was incompetent to refuse or accept treat-
121 James C. Beck, Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Psychiatric Assessment and
Legal Decision-making, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 368 (1987).
122 Id at 369 (footnotes omitted).
123 Id
124 Id ("Awareness, not agreement, is required for competence."). When a patient
is suspected of making treatment refusals on the basis of delusions, it is important to
make sure that she is in fact deluded. As Beck wrote, when a patient denies mental
illness she might be deluded, or she might be correct. In such a case one can check the
patient's symptoms against those listed in the American Psychiatric Association's Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual. DSM-III-R, supra note 4. As a patient's reasons for treat-
ment refusal become less clearly delusional, one must spend more time determining
exactly what the patient's reasoning is. Beck, supra note 121, at 370.
This distinction between disagreement and delusional rejection of treatment
prevails in other states as well. See San Diego Dep't of Social Serv. v. Waltz, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 436, 443 (Ct. App. 1986) ("[IThe evidence indicates a disagreement between
Waltz... and his physician .... This disagreement does not show Waltz' inability to
give informed consent.").
125 418 N.W.2d 139 (1988).
126 Id at 148 n.7.
127 437 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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ment with neuroleptics.128 In another 1989 decision, In re Peter-
son, 129 the court of appeals also applied the Beck analysis to find a
patient incompetent. In addition, the court explicitly stated that it
would find incompetence in future cases if a patient failed to meet
any of the three Beck criteria. 130
In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature encoded the framework of
the Jarvis and Price competency hearing requirements in section
253B.03, subdivision 6a,13 1 which was later amended to include the
psychiatric will provisions. 132 The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
jected a constitutional challenge to the 1988 statute in In re
Schmidt, 133 holding that the statute adequately embodied the protec-
tions developed in Price andJarvis.134 Specifically, the court deter-
mined that there was no facial violation of the Minnesota
Constitution's guarantee of a right to privacy,' 3 5 nor did the statute
deprive the patient of any due process rights of notice, hearing or
counsel. 13 6
In the absence of a patient's advance directive, Minnesota law
requires that three conditions be met before a patient may be
treated involuntarily with neuroleptics. First, the patient must have
been committed as mentally ill, or mentally ill and dangerous; 3 7
second, the patient must be incompetent to consent; 138 and third,
either (a) the patient's physicians must have obtained a court order
128 Id. at 108.
129 446 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
130 Id. at 673. "The Beck criteria require a finding of all three in favor of the patient
for competency to be found. Those advocating the use of involuntary neuroleptics need
not disprove all three in order to prevail." Id
131 Act of Apr. 28, 1988, ch. 689, art. 2, § 119, 1988 Minn. Laws 1279, 1362-63
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 253B.03, subd. 6 (Supp. 1993)).
132 Act of May 22, 1991, ch. 148, § 2, 1991 Minn. Laws 308, 310-11 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03, subd. 6(c) (West Supp. 1993)).
133 443 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1989).
134 Id. at 828. The challenges were specifically leveled at MINN. STAT. § 253B.03,
subd. 6a(c)(1) (Supp. 1993). This section allows neuroleptic medication without a hear-
ing when the patient does not consent if two other conditions are met: a guardian ad
litem gives consent, and a multidisciplinary treatment review panel gives written ap-
proval. The court determined that when a patient is unable to express refusal, the
guardian ad litem and the treatment review panel provide sufficient protection for the
rights of the patient. Id. at 828.
135 443 N.W.2d at 827.
136 Id. at 829-30.
137 The Minnesota courts have not been confronted with any requests for an order
to treat a non-committed patient with neuroleptics, psychosurgery or electroconvulsive
therapy. Section 253B.03, subdivision 6c governs non-consensual treatment with
neuroleptics of committed patients only. The standard for incompetence to consent to
an intrusive treatment, however, is higher than that required for commitment as men-
tally ill. In ordinary non-consenting treatment cases, therefore, the requirement of com-
mitment has little effect.
138 The application of § 253B.03, subdivision 6c(d) is premised on the patient's lack
of competence.
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for the treatment,13 9 or (b) the patient must have not objected to the
treatment, 140 and both the patient's guardian ad litem 14 1 and a
treatment review panel must have approved the treatment. 142 So
far, this system has worked well to protect the rights of the mentally
ill. As a result of physician respect for patient rights under this pro-
tective regime, Minnesota's courts have rejected very few physician
requests for treatment orders. 143
The protections afforded patients with mental illnesses in Min-
nesota are based on principles that inform the analogous law of
most other states. 144 These principles are threefold: 1) that there is
a general right of patients with mental illnesses to refuse treatment,
2) that this right may be infringed upon only after a specific showing
of incompetence to consent to the treatment, and 3) that in-
competence will be determined based on criteria that resemble
those outlined by Dr. Beck. 145
Many states find that the general right of a patient with a mental
illness to reject treatment is based on a right of privacy found either
in the federal or state constitution. 146 Regardless of the source of
this right, many states agree that the patient's refusal of treatment
cannot be overridden without an express determination of in-
competency; involuntary commitment to a mental institution is not
enough.147
In determining whether a patient is competent to make treat-
ment decisions, most courts employ some variation of Minnesota's
139 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(c) (Supp. 1993).
140 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(d)(1) (Supp. 1993).
141 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(d)(2) (Supp. 1993).
142 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(d)(3) (Supp. 1993).
143 See supra note 109.
144 See infra notes 146-48.
145 See supra notes 121-130 for a discussion of these three principles in Minnesota.
146 Minnesota bases such rights on its state constitution. Jarvis v. Levine, 418
N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988). Other states vary, with some simply finding the right in
common law. Aden v. Younger, 129 Cal.Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (federal consti-
tution); Goedecke v. Colorado 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979) (common law); Opinion
of the Justices, Request of the Senate No. 83-239, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983) (state con-
stitution); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (state constitution due pro-
cess clause).
147 For a discussion of this rule in Minnesota, see supra discussion accompanying
notes 119-20. For this rule in other states see inter alia: In re Weedon, 565 N.E.2d 432,
435 (Mass. 1991) ("[A] judicial finding of incompetence is a necessary precondition to
any substituted judgment treatment order .... "); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dept. of
Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1983) ("[A] mental patient has the right to
make treatment decisions and does not lose that right until the patient is adjudicated
incompetent by a judge through incompetence proceedings."); Rivers v. Katz, 495
N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986); Eleanor R. v. South Oaks Hosp., 506 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) ("Whether or not an involuntarily- committed mentally-ill patient has
the capacity to make a reasonable decision with respect to a particular treatment is
clearly a question of fact for a hearing court.").
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Beck criteria.148 They generally require that the patient be shown to
have a mental illness that interferes substantially with the patient's
decision-making process. 149 Such states find that a patient's denial
of a proven disease is evidence that such disease has undermined
the patient's decision-making powers. 150
The general protections provided by any state to patients with
mental illnesses will determine the contours of that state's Ulysses
enabling statute. The statute must fit into the established system for
determining whether a patient is competent to consent to treatment
and yet provide new treatment control choices. The law regarding
treatment of patients with mental illnesses is fairly uniform among
the states. Therefore, examining how a Ulysses enabling statute in
one state interacts with general mental health law can provide useful
lessons to the legislatures of other states.
B. Ulysses in Minnesota?-Penelope Still Waiting
1. Refusal or Revocation?
When a patient with a mental illness has executed a Ulysses di-
rective pursuant to the Minnesota Statute, and is incompetent but
does not refuse an invasive treatment, or is unable to communicate
consent or refusal, the patient will be able to receive the treatment
with little trouble. If the proposed treatment is a neuroleptic medi-
cation, section 253B.03, subdivision 6c(c) 151 allows the physician to
148 California, for example, states that:
Judicial determination of the specific competency to consent to drug
treatment should focus primarily upon three factors: (a) whether the pa-
tient is aware of his or her situation... (b) whether the patient is able to
understand the benefits and the risks of, as well as the alternatives to, the
proposed intervention ... and (c) whether the patient is able to under-
stand and to knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information re-
quired to be given ....
Riese v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 211 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
See Goedecke v. Colorado, 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979) (a patient will be found in-
competent to consent to or refuse treatment if the patient's mental illness has so im-
paired his judgment that he is "incapable of participating in decisions affecting his
health."); In re Bryant, 542 A.2d 1216 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding a patient incompe-
tent because of her delusional beliefs that she was God, and her denial of mental illness);
In re Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992) (ward determined incompetent to reject
treatment because he "denies that he is mentally ill .... [He] understands the risks
attendant on taking Stelazine, but he clearly does not appreciate the risks associated with
refusing it.").
149 See supra note 110.
150 See supra note 110.
151 "A neuroleptic medication may be administered to a patient who is not compe-
tent to consent to neuroleptic medications if the patient, when competent, prepared a
declaration under subdivision 6d requesting the treatment or authorizing a proxy to
request the treatment .... § 253B.03, subd. 6c(c) (Supp. 1993).
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administer the treatment without court approval. 152 If the proposed
treatment is electroshock therapy, subdivision 6d(c)[4-5] 153 allows
the same.
In a true Ulysses situation, however, the patient refuses the
treatment, as was his expectation while competent. A well drafted
Ulysses directive anticipates two kinds of refusal problems: a simple
refusal of the treatment, and an attempt to revoke the Ulysses direc-
tive itself.'54 An advance psychiatric directive statute will be ineffec-
tive unless it can adequately resolve both types of treatment refusal
problems. If one type of refusal destroys the effect of the Ulysses
directive, the competent patient will not be able to rely on the direc-
tive to enact his competent wishes.
To be fully effective, the statute must solve such treatment re-
fusal problems without resort to the courts. Because one reason for
drafting a Ulysses directive is to avoid the delay inherent in ob-
taining a treatment order, a Ulysses enabling statute that regularly
requires judicial intervention will give the Ulysses patient no advan-
tage over reliance on the traditional process for determining
incompetency.
Although the statute does not require it, there is little reason
for Minnesota courts to treat the two refusal problems-rejection of
treatment and revocation of the directive-differently. In either sit-
uation, the question reduces to one of whether the patient is compe-
tent to consent to the treatment. The Minnesota advance
psychiatric directive statute anticipates the problem of treatment re-
fusal. Paragraph (d) of subdivision 6c requires that the treatment
refusal of one who has executed a Ulysses directive be a competent
refusal.155 It further allows for the administration of neuroleptics to
a patient who is incompetent if that patient has executed a Ulysses
152 Where the patient makes no indication of refusal or is unable to consent or re-
fuse for reasons of the mental illness, the predicate of subdivision 6c(c), that the patient
is not competent to consent, is satisfied.
153 The physician or provider must comply with [the declaration] to the ful-
lest extent possible, consistent with reasonable medical practice, the
availability of treatments requested, and applicable law. The physician or
provider shall continue to obtain the declarant's informed consent to all
intrusive mental health treatment decisions if the declarant is capable of
informed consent.
§ 253B.03, subd. 6d(c)[4-5] (Supp. 1993).
154 If the statute is unduly permissive, then refusal of treatment reduces to revoca-
tion of the directive. Some living will statutes allow revocation by any act or statement
not consistent with an intention to keep the living will in force. A refusal of a treatment
withdrawal under such a living will is an inconsistent act canceling the living will. A
successful Ulysses directive cannot be so permissive in the options it allows for
revocation.
155 § 253B.03, subd. 6c(b-c) (Supp. 1993).
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directive. 156 Unlike paragraph (d), paragraph (c) 157 does not ex-
plain what to do if the patient refuses the treatment. This absence,
read together with the next paragraph's explicit mention of a treat-
ment refusal, suggests that paragraph (c) would allow the forced
treatment of an incompetent, refusing patient who has executed a
Ulysses directive.
When the problem is one of attempted revocation, the question
becomes what standard of competence the patient must meet to
make the revocation. 158 To draft a treatment directive, the patient
must be competent to consent to or reject treatments.' 59 Because
the directive contains treatment consents or refusals, the revocation
of such a directive amounts to a treatment refusal or acceptance.
The standard for revoking a treatment directive should therefore be
the same as that required for drafting one, namely competence to
consent to or refuse treatments. This is the same standard that must
be met in the case of simple treatment refusal.
A different subsection of the statute governs electroconvulsive
therapy, 160 but the analysis is the same. The statute requires the
physician or provider to "obtain the declarant's informed consent to
all intrusive mental health treatment decisions if the declarant is ca-
pable of informed consent."' 161 Electroshock therapy is specifically
included in the definition of "intrusive mental health treatment,"' 162
so again the question reduces to one of competence to consent to
the treatment.
The inquiry does not end by asking whether the patient is com-
petent to consent to a treatment. If the patient is found incompe-
tent to consent to the treatment, the court must establish that the
treatment is reasonable and appropriate for the patient. 163 A
Ulysses directive enabling statute must be able to account for this
step of the process leading to treatment.
156 Id.
157 See supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
158 "A declaration under this subdivision may be revoked in whole or in part at any
time and in any manner by the declarant if the declarant is competent at the time of
revocation." § 253B.03, subd. 6d(e) (Supp. 1993). The statute does not specify the
applicable standard of competence.
159 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(a) (Supp. 1993).
160 The administration of neuroleptics is governed specifically by § 253B.03 subdivi-
sion 6c, and generally by subdivision 6d. Electroshock therapy is controlled by subdivi-
sion 6d.
161 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(c)[5] (Supp. 1993).
162 § 253B.03, subd. 6b (Supp. 1993).
163 See discussion infra part II.B.2.
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2. Price/Jarvis Reasonableness Hearing
In Price v. Sheppard,'64 the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled
that the forcible administration of intrusive mental health treat-
ments to a committed incompetent patient requires a court or-
der. 165 In making such a determination, a court must hold an
adversary proceeding to "determine the necessity and reasonable-
ness of the prescribed treatment."' 166 The Price court listed six fac-
tors for a court to consider in making the reasonableness and
necessity determination. 167 The last factor is "the patient's ability to
competently determine for himself whether the treatment is desir-
able."' 68 This factor is essentially a determination of competency to
consent to the treatment. Presumably, where the court finds that
the patient is entirely able to decide for herself whether to accept
the treatment, it will find coerced treatment unreasonable and
unnecessary.' 69
The Minnesota Supreme Court inJarvis v. Levine ' 70 made clear
that the hearings have two purposes: (1) to determine whether the
patient is indeed unable to consent to treatment, 17' and (2) to deter-
mine the reasonableness and necessity of the proposed treat-
ment. 72 Incompetence to consent to the treatment is the threshold
for the assessment of the treatment.' 73
The patient's drafting of a Ulysses directive obviates the second
part of the Price/Jaruis hearing. While drafting her Ulysses directive,
the patient will have the same information available to her as a court
holding a Price/Jarvis hearing. If such a patient is competent, as she
must be to draft a Ulysses directive, 74 then she is just as capable as
the courts of weighing the first five factors that the Price court rec-
ommended for determining the necessity and reasonableness of a
proposed treatment.' 75 She can list conditions under which her
164 239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
165 Id. at 913.
166 Id. Most other states also require some sort of hearing to determine the advisa-
bility of the proposed treatment. See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985); supra
note 110. This is sometimes referred to as "substitutedjudgment." See In re Bryant, 542
A.2d 1216 (D.C. 1988).
167 See supra note 112.
168 239 N.W.2d at 913.
169 The premise of the hearing is, after all, that "[t]he state's interest in assuming
the decision is in acting as parens patriae, fulfilling its duty to protect the well-being of its
citizens who are incapable of so acting for themselves." (emphasis added). Id. at 911.
170 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
171 Id. at 148 n.7.
172 Id at 148.
173 Id. at 148 n.7.
174 253B.03, subdivision 6d(a) states: "A competent adult may make a declara-
tion .... (emphasis added).
175 See supra note 114.
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physician should make changes to the proposed treatment, and she
can put limits and conditions on dosages or types of medications. 176
One extra purpose that the Price/Jarvis hearing might serve is to
verify that the patient is actually suffering from the condition for
which she was planning. Courts have usually made such determina-
tions by referring to the descriptions of illnesses listed in the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third
Edition (DSM-III).177 Absent bad faith on the part of the treating
physician, the determination of illness is straight-forward and un-
controversial.1 78 If a physician thought of using a Ulysses directive
to treat a patient in inappropriate situations, the threat of an adver-
sary hearing to establish the patient's illness might give the physi-
cian pause. It is not clear whether such a hearing would stop a very
determined physician.
The illness verification element of the Price/Jarvis hearing prob-
ably affords no more protection than the Minnesota Statute already
provides. The statute requires the physician to "comply with [the
directive] to the fullest extent possible, consistent with reasonable
medical practice ... and applicable law."' 79 A physician applying
the criteria of DSM-III-R 180 in good faith will go through the same
steps, and thus reach the same result, as a court. If the physician
reaches a different conclusion, she could be liable for treating the
patient in a manner at variance with the provisions of the patient's
Ulysses directive or for malpractice in misapplying DSM-III-R.181
3. Competence to Consent
The determination of competence to consent to treatment is a
court's most important function in treatment decision cases, and the
176 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(a) (Supp. 1993).
177 See Beck, supra note 121, at 370; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOS-
TIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-III (3d ed. 1978). In 1987
the American Psychiatric Association came out with revised version of the third edi-
tion-DSM-III-R-and it is now at work on DSM-IV.
178 "DSM-III and DSM-III-R provide specific diagnostic criteria as guides for mak-
ing each diagnosis since such criteria enhance interjudge diagnostic reliability." DSM-
III-R, supra note 4, at xxiv.
179 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(c)[4] (Supp. 1993).
180 DSM-III-R is currently the appropriate manual for use.
181 § 253B.03, subd. 6d(c)[4] (Supp. 1993). The statute requires treatment in ac-
cordance with the Ulysses directive, but does not provide specifically for punishment. If
the physician has applied a treatment not approved by the patient in her directive, a
remedy will probably exist under a theory of assault and battery. If the physician varies
from the directive by not providing treatment, and has not complied with the sub-
division 6d(d)[2] notification requirements, the patient will probably have a malpractice
case against the physician. This might be premised on either a per se violation of subdi-
vision 6d(d)[2], or on a breach of assumed duty to treat. By failing to voice an intention
not to treat when presented with the directive, the physician implicitly agrees to act in
accordance with the directive.
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one that courts are least likely to surrender. 8 2 In Ulysses situations,
this determination is central to the effectiveness of the directive. It
also highlights the dangers of misapplication of a Ulysses directive.
a. The Ulysses Directive's Scylla and Charybdis
There are two dangers in making a determination of a patient's
ability or inability to consent: refusing consent to one truly capable
of consent, and giving the power of consent to one who is not com-
petent to exercise that power. The first danger conflicts with funda-
mental interests of liberty, privacy, and autonomy and raises serious
due process and equal protection concerns.18 3 If a statute is poorly
drafted, it might enable some patients with mental illnesses to plan
for and control their illnesses, while it subjects others to truly un-
wanted treatment. Because due process concerns require that a
statute affecting a fundamental interest be narrowly tailored to its
legitimate end,' 8 4 and because the ability to refuse intrusive treat-
ment is a fundamental individual right,' 85 the constitutionality of a
Ulysses statute may depend on how well it avoids this first
danger.186
The second problem is the one that the Ulysses directive is spe-
cifically designed to avoid.' 8 7 The enabling statute must not be so
182 It would be both unreasonable and unnecessary for the courts to become
involved in every post-commitment treatment decision; however, it is
equally clear that the courts cannot abdicate all responsibility for protect-
ing a committed person's fundamental rights merely because some de-
gree of medical judgment is implicated. When medicaljudgments collide with
a patient's fundamental rights... it is the courts, not the doctors, who possess the
necessary expertise.
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 147-148 (Minn. 1988) (emphasis added). Other
courts have made similar statements:
The determination by a physician that an individual is mentally in-
competent to refuse drug treatment cannot be exempted from judicial
evaluation on the ground that the medical determination rests upon an
unimpeachable scientific foundation. . . . [F]orcible administration of
powerful mind-altering drugs also involves moral and ethical considera-
tions not solely within the purview of the medical profession, and must be
measured by the social consensus reflected in our laws. Exemption of
these decisions from such external evaluation would invest physicians
with a degree of power over others ... [at odds] with the great value our
society places on the autonomy of the individual.
Riese v. Saint Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 271 Cal. Rptr. 199, 212-13 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987).
183 See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12, at §§ III.A.,B.,D. (discussing
constitutional concerns with voluntary commitment contracts).
184 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972).
185 But see Minnesota State Bd. of Health v. Brainard, 241 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. 1976)
(upholding fluoridation of local water supply over individual interest in not receiving
fluoridation treatment).
186 See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12, at part III.D.
187 SeeJoseph A. Rogers & Benedict Centitanti, Beyond "Self-Paternalism'" Response to
Rosenson and Kasten, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 9, 10 (1991).
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weak that it allows patients who have executed Ulysses directives
either to reject treatments, or to postpone the application of a treat-
ment until after a hearing. Otherwise, the Ulysses directive will be
of limited value.
The ideal is to correctly designate every person as competent or
incompetent. Where this is not attainable, however, constitutional
jurisprudence suggests that making the second of the two errors is
preferable to making the first.188 Therefore, where a directive en-
abling statute cannot be precise, it should be too weak rather than
too strong.
The Minnesota courts' model for determining ability to consent
to treatment 8 9 specifies those abilities necessary for a competent
exercise of treatment choice. The exercise of discretion comes in
applying the criteria to a case. When the patient denies having an
illness, for example, there are two possibilities: (1) the patient is
making an honest, true statement, or (2) the patient is deluded. In
such circumstances the courts decide by referring to DSM-I-R.190
Where there is strong evidence that the patient has an illness, but
the patient denies it, a court will find the patient incompetent to
make treatment decisions.191 If the court suspects that the patient is
basing her treatment refusal on delusional beliefs, the court may
have to question the patient personally in order to assess the pa-
tient's ability to reason. 192
The problem with Ulysses directives is that they rely for their
effectiveness on a quick determination of illness and competency.' 93
To make Ulysses directives work, the courts must be willing either
to provide very quick access for competency assessments, or to dele-
gate the competency assessment function. Minnesota law allows for
commitment hearings within fourteen days of a request for one,
with a potential thirty-one day extension on a showing of good
cause. 194 For a patient with a degenerating mental illness, however,
having to wait two weeks before beginning treatment can be a signif-
icant hardship. Rather than being able to receive treatment on an
outpatient basis, the patient may experience a full-blown relapse re-
188 The decision requires the balancing of fundamental personal interests-privacy,
autonomy, self-determination-with the state parens patriae interest. The state therefore
has the burden of establishing its interest via a finding of competence, before it can
consider invading the individual's fundamental interests.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 121-30.
190 Beck, supra note 121, at 370 (stating that DSM-III is used). Courts now use the
later version, DSM-III-R.
191 Beck, supra note 121, at 370.
192 Beck, supra note 121, at 370.
193 See discussion supra part I.B.2. explaining the need for Ulysses directives.
194 MINN. STAT. § 253A.07, subd. 8 (1982).
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quiring hospitalization. 9 5 The questions then become: how well
can the results of extra-judidal competency assessments replicate
traditional assessments, and how well can the patient's constitu-
tional rights be protected outside of the courtroom?
b. Replicability
The first Beck criterion for assessing competencym-that the pa-
tient be aware of her illness-is relatively straightforward and easy
to apply. 196 DSM-III-R was designed to provide objective and con-
sistent diagnoses of illnesses and so lends itself to the out-of-court
application of a Ulysses directive. 197
The second Beck criterion, that the patient be able to under-
stand and assess the treatment options, 198 can also be objectively
analyzed. A group at Johns Hopkins University has proposed a
competency assessment test that fulfills this purpose.' 99 The fif-
teen-minute long test is given orally and can be adjusted for the
reading level of the patient.200 The administrator of the test reads
the patient a short passage about competency and then poses a se-
ries of questions about the passage.20 1 The answers are used to de-
termine understanding and analytical ability.20 2 Because this
method is objective, it does not allow as much flexibility as that en-
joyed by a judge questioning a patient. Where the patient scores
very close to the threshold for competency, it might be difficult to
say conclusively whether the patient is in fact competent. In these
circumstances, the physician can either supplement the exam with a
longer, more extensive test, or send the patient to a hearing. This
decision can be made simply on the basis of the patient's initial
score, thereby eliminating worries about physician discretion.
The third criterion is the most difficult to analyze, as Beck him-
self points out.20 3 The patient's basis for refusal of treatment may
be part delusional and part rational. The person who determines
competency must therefore question the patient to the extent neces-
sary to determine the patient's true reasons for refusing treatment,
195 Rosenson & Kasten, supra note 7, at 3.
196 See discussion supra accompanying notes 121-30.
197 See discussion supra accompanying notes 177-78.
198 See supra text accompanying note 122.
199 Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., The Hopkins Competency Assessment Test: A Brief Method for
Evaluating Patients' Capacity to Give Informed Consent, 43 J. Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY
132 (1992).
200 "Versions of the essay at the 13th-grade, eighth-grade, and sixth-grade reading
levels were prepared." Id. at 132.
201 Id.
202 Id
203 Beck, supra note 121, at 370.
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and must examine the rationality of those reasons.20 4 At this point,
a physician's bad faith, inexperience or lack of thoroughness will be
most able to affect the outcome of the competency assessment.
If a patient fails to meet any one of these three Beck criteria, she
will be deemed incompetent. 205 In a large number of the diseases
for which patients would create Ulysses directives, the patient de-
nies illness. For cases in which the denial of illness is one, or the
only, failed criteria, the result of the competency assessment is likely
to be identical to that of a court. The same holds true if the patient
fails to meet only the second criterion. When the delusional belief
criterion comes into play, however, physicians might be inclined to
look harder for a failure in another area. Courts may, therefore, be
loathe to delegate competency assessment. Such a partial delega-
tion may not adequately protect the patient.
c. Protecting Patients' Rights
The Minnesota courts have found that due process rights under
the Minnesota Constitution are stronger than analogous federal
protections; therefore, courts decide such cases using the Minnesota
Constitution. 20 6 Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Yetka was refer-
ring to rights afforded by the Minnesota Constitution when he wrote
injarvis v. Levine 207 that "[w]hen medical judgments collide with a
patient's fundamental rights ... it is the courts, not the doctors, who
possess the necessary expertise." 208
The Minnesota courts, like the courts of most states, 20 9 regard
the right to refuse treatment very highly,2 10 and are unlikely to allow
an infringement of this right without a strong showing. The state
courts are also careful to limit power given to physicians in treat-
ment decision cases. 21'
The federal courts are not as reluctant to allow physicians
broad treatment power. In 1982 the United States Supreme Court
decided Youngberg v. Romeo,212 holding that, in determining whether
204 Beck, supra note 121, at 370.
205 In re Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
206 See In re Schmidt 443 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989). Other state courts have
also construed their constitutions as providing broader protections than the Federal
Constitution. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).
207 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1988).
208 Id. at 147-48.
209 See supra note 146.
210 "To deny mentally ill individuals the opportunity to exercise [the right to refuse
treatment] is to deprive them of basic human dignity by denying their personal auton-
omy." Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 148 (Minn. 1988).
211 Id. at 148. See supra note 110.
212 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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an institution had met its obligations to patients with developmental
disabilities, "courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional. ' 213
The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted Youngberg's standard
inJarvis v. Levine, 214 concluding that where the decision to invade a
patient's liberty interests is made in the exercise of professional
judgment, due process requirements are satisfied.21 5 The court of
appeals also cited decisions from other states applying the "profes-
sional judgment" standard.21 6
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this adoption of the
professional judgment standard and distinguished Youngberg. The
court held that the professional judgment standard does not apply
under Minnesota law to intrusive mental health treatments adminis-
tered against a patient's wishes.2 17 The court cited changing social
values regarding the nature of the physician-patient relationship, as
well as the crimes committed by Nazi physicians during World War
II, as reasons for being cautious in allocating decision making power
to physicians.2 18 It also rejected the lower court's contention that
Minnesota recognized "[a] presumption of incompetency to make
psychiatric treatment decisions when commitment is premised on a
finding of mental illness .... ",219
The coldness with which the Minnesota judiciary regards the
idea of treatment decision power in the hands of physicians will be
the downfall of any attempt at a Ulysses directive under the current
Minnesota advance psychiatric directive statute. There are no statu-
tory provisions for either an accelerated competency hearing or for
the delegation of such a function to the declarant's physicians. The
213 Id. at 322.
214 403 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, by 418 N.W.2d
139 (Minn. 1988).
215 M The Minnesota Court of Appeals also cited the Supreme Court's remand of
Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982) as support for its position.
216 403 N.W.2d at 309.
217 418 N.W.2d at 147. Without specifically rejecting Youngberg, most other state
courts also impose a higher standard in treatment decision cases than the professional
judgment standard. See supra note 110.
218 "The public has been unwilling, quite properly, to allow professionals such as
lawyers, doctors, dentists and others a completely free hand in handling either a client,
customer or patient's case." 418 N.W.2d at 148. "[W]e recall that mental patients in
the past have been used as tools for experimentation and new techniques. Many of the
atrocities committed in Nazi Germany were allegedly carried out under the guise of 'im-
proving' medical science."
219 403 N.W.2d at 307. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this contention.
418 N.W.2d at 147 ("Commitment to an institution does not deprive an individual of all
legal rights").
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Minnesota Courts are unlikely to allow any approximation of these
functions without express legislative approval. 220
III
CHANGING THE LAW IN ULYSSES' FAVOR
To accommodate fully the needs of a patient who wishes to
draft a Ulysses directive, the Minnesota Legislature must make
changes to the current advance psychiatric directive statute. It must
address the due process and consent concerns described above, and
should also add provisions taking advantage of lessons learned from
other types of advance directive statutes.
Because Minnesota law is sufficiently similar to the mental
health treatment law of other states, 221 the adjusted Minnesota stat-
ute can serve as a model for other state legislatures. With only a few
further changes to accommodate minor differences in state commit-
ment laws, such a statute could be adopted by any state to enable its
citizens to draft Ulysses directives.
A. Due Process and Consent
As discussed above, there are two ways in which a legislature
might meet the Ulysses patient's need for a quick competency deter-
mination. The legislature could provide for an expedited judicial
hearing, or it could allow someone other than a judge to establish
the patient's competence or incompetence. For some patients who
draft Ulysses directives even a one day delay in treatment can have a
dramatic impact on the severity of their relapse.222 In emergencies,
judges make medical treatment decisions in hours, but the amena-
bility of the judiciary to additional emergency decisionmaking re-
sponsibilities is questionable. The advantage of such an
arrangement, however, is that a judge is likely to become familiar
with a patient who regularly suffers relapses from the same disease,
and will be better able to make a competency assessment.
The other option is to delegate the competency determination
to the patient's physicians. When the patient suffers from a mental
disease that predisposes her to refuse proffered treatments, such a
220 The argument that the execution of a Ulysses contract (as distinguished from a
statutorily authorized directive) grants the declarant's physician discretion in determin-
ing the competency of the patient is likely to fail on anti-slavery, vagueness, and equal
protection grounds. See Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra note 12, at part III.
Another argument, that the signing of a Ulysses contract reverses the presumption
of competence, will fail for similar reasons. Additionally, there is no strong basis in state
law for a presumption of incompetency once the state has rejected such a presumption for
committed patients with mental illnesses.
221 See discussion supra part II.A.
222 See Rosenson & Kasten, supra, note 7 at 2-3.
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patient could choose in advance the option of physician assessment
of competence. Until the next available hearing date,223 the patient
would permit her physician, with review by a hospital panel, to de-
termine her competence. The legislature could specify use of the
three-part Beck competency assessment as the basis for this out-of-
court determination. 224 Under such a test the patient can be as-
sured both that the treatment will be given an opportunity to take
effect and that eventually she will receive a full competency hearing.
This sort of statute would have the effect of establishing, under cer-
tain conditions and for a short period of time, a reversal of the pre-
sumption in favor of the patient's competence. It would not,
however, establish de facto incompetence for the time period. The
panel of physicians can always find the patient competent again
before the judicial hearing.225
B. Other Concerns
Besides changing the method of competency assessment, the
Minnesota Legislature should consider other changes to make the
current statute better able to accommodate the needs of patients
without weakening the protections afforded those patients. An
amendment should include a section requiring that anyone drafting
a Ulysses directive have been diagnosed with the recurring illness to
be treated under the provisions of the document, and further, that
the person have been previously treated with the requested medica-
tion or procedure. 226 This requirement grows from a concern about
consent: a patient's consent to an unexperienced future course of
treatment cannot be sufficiently informed consent.
A patient who binds herself to a series of electroconvulsive
treatments may not fully understand the commitment that she is
making. In normal circumstances she is able to withdraw consent at
any time;227 but under a Ulysses directive she will not have this op-
tion. The treatments might be more painful than she anticipated,
223 In Minnesota, this interval is ordinarily two weeks. With a showing of good
cause it can take up to forty-five days. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.07, subd. 8 (West
1982).
224 See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
225 Note that the danger of a physician "nursing" a patient into a long period of
incompetence does not exist because of the revocation clause. If a physician tried to
reset the two week period before a hearing by finding a patient competent, and then
finding the patient incompetent again shortly thereafter, the patient could revoke the
directive during the period of competence.
226 A similar requirement is suggested in Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists, supra
note 12, at 782.
227 Under Minnesota law, for example, absent a Ulysses directive a physician must
withdraw the treatment as soon as the patient voices refusal and until the patient gives
competent consent or the physician obtains a court order. See discussion supra part II.A.
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and she may later regret the forced treatment. Any subsequent at-
tempt to withdraw her consent while incompetent raises real ques-
tions about whether the treatment should continue. 228 In contrast,
if the patient has already experienced a treatment, the patient is fa-
miliar with the nature and side effects of the treatment and is as-
sumed to have determined that the suffering involved is worth the
outcome.
The statute should also make clear that the power of attorney
can be used to change the treatment directives unless otherwise lim-
ited. 229 Many people with mental illnesses will have taken advan-
tage of the durable power of attorney to safeguard children and
property, and these patients should know how that power will inter-
act with their advance psychiatric directive. The best alternative to
simply providing information in the Ulysses directive statute is to
enact a statute excluding revocation of the directive from the pow-
ers granted under the power of attorney. The disadvantage of this
approach is that it eliminates flexibility. 230 Attempting to provide
the drafter with complete information preserves this flexibility at the
expense of a small risk that some Ulysses directives will be altered
by the holder of a durable power of attorney.
The statute should also contain a section encouraging the pa-
tient to give thought to what she wants done if she is discovered to
be pregnant while incompetent. Some of the treatments that the
patient requested may have an adverse effect on the development of
a fetus.231 If the legislature includes mention of this contingency in
the statute, the drafter will be reminded of the possibility and can
plan accordingly. 23 2 By requiring an explicit statement by the pa-
tient detailing what she wants done in the event of pregnancy, the
statute avoids the constitutional problems of living will pregnancy
228 ROBERT M. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 309-310 (1977) (describ-
ing such a case of questionable application of prospective self-binding to an unexperi-
enced treatment).
229 See discussion supra part I.A.2.b.
230 Patients might want to allow revocation of the Ulysses directive by the holder of
the power of attorney as a protection against application of the directive by physicians.
231 For example, neuroleptics can cross the placenta and produce damage in the
developing fetus. See Michael A. Taylor, Indications for Electroconvulsive Therapy, in ELEc-
TROCONVULSIVE THERAPY 7, 17 (Richard Abrams & Walter B. Essman eds., 1982).
232 Some living will statutes have tried to deal with this problem by revoking the
effect of the living will for the duration of the pregnancy. This is of questionable consti-
tutionality. See supra note 49. If it can be upheld, it is another argument for the appoint-
ment of a proxy. The proxy can direct that an abortion be performed. The living will
then returns to effect, and the removal of life support can proceed.
Where the mother is suffering from a mental illness, the interest of the fetus and of
the mother may conflict because of treatments received by the mother. The mother
should be encouraged to plan accordingly and, of course, to appoint a proxy.
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clauses233 and eliminates the uncertainty that results from the ab-
sence of any such direction.
Finally, a Ulysses directive statute should contain a provision
providing protection against psychiatrists coercing patients into cre-
ating such a directive. If the legislature fails to include such a provi-
sion, the statute will provide a means for physicians to assume
control of treatment decisions. Such a provision must apply at the
drafting stage of the directive; requiring a hearing on undue influ-
ence, as with a testamentary will, gives the incompetent patient an-
other way to force judicial examination of the medical treatment,
subverting the Ulysses directive's advantage of expedience.2 3 4
An anti-coercion provision could be as simple as requiring the
patient to consult with an independent psychiatrist on the merits of
a Ulysses directive. The statute could also employ one of the safe-
guards of the Minnesota neuroleptic treatment statute23 5 and re-
quire approval of the directive by a multidisciplinary hospital review
board before the patient signs the directive.2 3 6
CONCLUSION
The right of Americans with mental illnesses to control their
treatment while incompetent is developing slowly. The Minnesota
advance psychiatric directive statute is a step in the right direction,
but it does not successfully meet the needs of all patientg with
mental illnesses.
Patients with recurring mental illnesses have special needs that
require innovative solutions. Such illnesses can be a great burden
on the patient, both emotionally and financially; the costs to society
are equally as great. The Ulysses directive provides a way of
preventing these costs by allowing the patient to choose treatments
in advance of a later relapse. Such a document increases the pa-
tient's control of her own life and reduces the cost of her illness to
both herself and to society.
The Minnesota advance directive statute shows promise for the
resolution of some of these problems, but fails to deliver a complete
solution for patients with recurrent mental illnesses. This Note has
shown how the Minnesota Statute fails in this respect. It has out-
lined specific procedural problems with the statute and has located
the source of these problems in case law. Finally, it has proposed
changes to the statute that would give more control over treatment
decisions to people with mental illnesses. Such changes would turn
233 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
234 See discussion supra part II.B. 1.
235 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03, subd. 6c (West Supp. 1993).
236 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.0 3, subd. 6c(d)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
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the Minnesota Statute into a model that legislatures across the coun-
try could follow in the drafting of Ulysses directive enabling stat-
utes. This would, in turn, significantly lighten the burden that
recurrent mental illnesses now impose on the citizens of all states.
Roberto Cucat
t The author would like to thank Professor H. Richard Beresford, Janet M. Cuca,
Roberto Cuca, and Yvette P. Cuca for extensive comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
All errors are, of course, the author's own.
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